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International Trade Regime:
Considerations for Harmonization
Charles E. Di Leva* and Xiaoxin Shi**

T

I. Introduction

he Paris Agreement1 broadens the international commitment to protect the climate under the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol.2 This commitment is largely
represented through the Agreement’s requirement that both
developed and developing countries have shared obligations to
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.3 As a testament to the
international community’s commitment, the Agreement entered
into force ahead of expectations on November 4, 2016.4
The Paris Agreement creates binding obligations on all
Parties to establish procedures to pursue their nationally determined course of actions to achieve GHG emission reduction
targets established through domestic (“bottom-up”) processes,
rather than globally agreed binding numerical emission reduction targets in the Kyoto Protocol for “developed countries.”5
Specifically, the Agreement requires Parties to institute a continuous planning process to mitigate and adapt to climate change
impacts, documented in a “nationally determined contribution
every five years.”6 National emission reduction targets and the
proposed policy instruments to achieve them are documented
in the intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) or,
once a country has ratified the Paris Agreement, their nationally
determined contributions (NDCs).7 The Paris Agreement allows
for adjustments of the emission reduction targets and proposed
policy instruments.8 These adjustments will emanate from a continuous national planning process.9 While Parties are expected to
“maintain successive nationally determined contributions,” they
can make such adjustments at any time “with a view to enhancing
[the Party’s] level of ambition”10 to cope with climate change.
Among the 164 INDCs submitted,11 nearly half of the countries explicitly propose to increase their use of renewable energy
by providing financial incentives such as a trade-in-tariff systems;
about one-third of the countries specifically mention improving industrial processes as a strategy to reduce GHG emissions;
three countries propose to impose a carbon tax; and two countries propose to imposing labeling standards and restrictions on
importation of appliances that are energy inefficient.12 It is our
view that these types of climate mitigation measures will impact
global trade to varying degrees. Because of the imminence of the
implementation of some countries’ measures, there is a resurgence
of attention to the “trade versus environment” question.13
This paper posits that there is no direct conflict between
the Paris Agreement and regional or international trade agreements. These trade agreements and their case law, as well as the
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language of the Paris Agreement indicate that fulfilling a state’s
obligations under the Paris Agreement and acting pursuant to
their NDCs should not automatically lead to the assumption
that there is a trade and environment conflict. However, Parties
need to be cognizant of their trade agreement obligations that are
fundamental to the protection of free trade and investor expectations. This paper aims to help understand the space where countries could implement INDCs and NDCs without violating the
principles of trade agreements.

II. Trade-Related Initiatives to
Reduce Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Emissions
Post Paris Agreement
1. The Paris Agreement: Mandatory National
Planning Process, Non-Binding GHG Emission
Reduction Targets
The Paris Agreement is a procedurally oriented instrument
that, unlike the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, does not include
specific regulatory parameters. It requires Parties to implement a course of actions that lead to a unspecified amount of
GHG emission reduction, recognizing the need to hold “the
increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C above
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels.”14 The Paris
Agreement requires Parties to, inter alia, institute a continuous
planning process of determining national GHG emission reduction targets, as well as mitigation15 and adaptation16 measures.
Specifically, Parties “shall” communicate the GHG emission
reduction targets and mitigation measures in “a nationally
determined contribution every five years”17 and communicate
adaptation measures “as a component of or in conjunction with
other communications or documents, including . . . a nationally
determined contribution.”18 A Party “may at any time adjust its
existing nationally determined contribution,” 19 making the mandatory national planning process a continuous one.
Additionally, the Paris Agreement does not prescribe the
exact content of NDCs. Instead, Parties determine the mitigation
measures to be undertaken to collectively achieve the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. Decision 1/CP.20, part of the
“Lima Call for Climate Action,” suggests a list of items that a
NDC should address.20 Paragraph 14 of the Decision provides
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that INDCs “may include, as appropriate, inter alia,” quantifiable
information on the reference point, planning processes, time
periods for implementation, just to name a few.21 Most INDCs
provide only a nation-wide emission reduction target, accompanied by generally defined mitigation strategies. For example,
Indonesia’s INDC states that it is committed to reduce 26% of
GHG emission against the business as usual scenario by 202022
and will reduce emissions through forest conservation, increased
renewable energy use, as well as improved waste management.23
Realization of such strategies that are stated only in general
terms requires further regulatory and/or legislative actions.
Depending on Parties’ ambitions, they may use an existing legal framework or propose new legislation to reduce GHG
emissions. For example, South Africa proposes in its NDC to
develop policy instruments such as a carbon tax, desired emission reduction outcomes for sectors, and company-level carbon budgets to reduce GHG emissions.24 In contrast to South
Africa, the United States emphasizes in its NDC that the U.S.
economy-wide GHG emission reduction target is based on an
examination of the “opportunities under existing regulatory
authorities.”25 The United States ratified the Paris Agreement
as an executive agreement without advice and consent from
the Senate, which had ratified the UNFCCC.26 Such ratification process reflects the rationale that the Paris Agreement
does not legally require the United States to take action
beyond its obligations under the UNFCCC and, as a Party to
the UNFCCC, the U.S. Executive Branch has sufficient legal
authority under existing law for developing and implementing
necessary mitigation measures to achieve the national commitment.27 Moreover, the Paris Agreement does not provide
requirements on the substance of INDCs and NDCs that are
more specific than those in the Decision 1/CP.20, part of the
“Lima call for climate action.”28 The Agreement provides only
general requirements that a successive NDC “will represent a
progression beyond” the Party’s current NDC29 and that the
NDCs should be “ambitious.”30 As such, the GHG emission
reduction targets in the NDCs are not considered to be legally
binding, at least under U.S. law, and Parties have considerable
flexibility in deciding the actions they would take to contribute
to the global goal of GHG emission reduction.31 Therefore,
the Paris Agreement affords Parties considerable flexibility in
developing NDCs based on national circumstances.

2. Post Paris Agreement: More Ambitious National
Actions to Reduce GHG Emissions
The Paris Agreement employs a procedure-based approach
coupled with a mechanism to help Parties implement their NDCs.
The consequence of Parties not achieving the claimed GHG emission reduction targets, however, lacks the type of sanction for
non-compliance that existed under the Kyoto Protocol.32 As set
forth in Article 15 of the Paris Agreement, challenges in fulfilling the NDCs are to be dealt with through a “mechanism” that is
designed “to facilitate implementation and promote compliance”
(emphasis added).33 The Article 15 mechanism has four elements.
First, the INDCs and NDCs are public documents.34 Second, a
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technical expert review of the supporting information provided
by Parties on the implementation and progress of the INDCs and
NDCs is required.35 Third, the Paris Agreement requires a global
“stocktake” in 2023 “of collective progress towards achieving the
purpose of [the Paris] Agreement and its long-term goals” and
every five years thereafter,36 which provides the basis for Parties
to adjust their actions.37 Finally, an expert-based committee facilitates compliance by taking measures that are “transparent, nonadversarial and non-punitive.”38 Therefore, although Parties enjoy
discretion in deciding their emission reduction targets and means
to achieve these targets, the procedural obligations under the Paris
Agreement enhance the public exposure of Parties’ commitments
and hence incentivize compliance by Parties.
As of November 2016, 163 INDCs have been submitted.39
The emission reduction strategies stated in INDCs typically
include increasing renewable energy in the energy mix, improving industrial processes, incentivizing energy efficiency, and
improving solid waste management.40 Some INDCs present
more specific policy instruments to reduce GHG emissions.41
Four types of these policy instruments are of particular relevance
to the issue of design and implementation that does not violate
the principles of fair trade under international agreements. We
explore these principles in the following sections of this paper.
The first category of instrument is the use of tax and tariff,
including tax or tax reduction measure based on CO2 emission
or energy efficiency of the product,42 a tax measure based on the
energy consumption in the production process such as utilities,43
a feed-in-tariff to incentivize renewable energy investments,44
and an import duty on goods that are energy-inefficient such as
used vehicles.45 The second category is a financial requirement
on certain investments to contribute funds for climate change
mitigation.46 The third category is the development of energy
efficiency standards for appliances.47 The fourth category is the
use of technical standards for reducing GHG emissions from
industrial processes.48 These policy instruments are likely to have
impacts on international trade as they distinguish products based
on factors that some may contend are not based on the “likeness”
of a product.49 In addition, at least some countries may proceed
to quickly lay out the specifics of these policy instruments given
their declaration of ambitious national commitments under the
Paris Agreement. Depending on the nature of these relatively
new policy instruments and the manner in which they are implemented, they might interfere with what some trading partners or
foreign investors would claim as their “reasonable expectations.”
The following sections of this paper explore the boundaries on
climate-related policy instruments under major regional and
international trade agreements.

III. The Interface Between the
Paris Agreement and International
Trade Agreements
This section discusses the interface between the Paris
Agreement and international trade agreements by examining
the relevant requirements and cases under the bilateral trade
agreements, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),
21

the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. An examination is
necessary because neither the Paris Agreement nor the 1992
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC), under which the Paris Agreement was negotiated, defines such interface explicitly. Instead, both the Paris
Agreement and the UNFCCC indicate the expectation of harmonious interaction with trade agreements.
Specifically, Article 3 of the UNFCCC provides that in
achieving its objective, Parties “should cooperate to promote a
supportive and open international economic system” (emphasis
added) and “[m]easures taken to combat climate change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on
international trade” (emphasis added).50 The wording “should”
suggests that compliance with the UNFCCC provides no categorical exceptions to the trade restrictions that would otherwise
be inconsistent with international trade agreements.51 Similarly,
the preamble of the Paris Agreement states that Parties “[r]
ecogniz[e] that Parties may be affected . . . by the impacts of
the measures taken in response to [climate change]” and “[e]
mphasiz[e] the intrinsic relationship that climate change actions,
responses and impacts have with equitable access to sustainable
development and eradication of poverty.”52 These clauses suggest that Parties need to take into account the potential trade and
economic implications of climate change mitigation actions and
examine whether the regulatory actions would violate international trade agreements to which they are also Parties.

1. Cases under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)
Bilateral and multilateral investment treaties typically afford
foreign investors the protection against expropriation, unjustifiable and arbitrary treatment, and discriminatory treatment compared with other foreign or domestic investors,53 as well as the
right of private parties to bring a claim against states on these
substantive rights.54
The interface between these treaties and their Parties’ environmental regulations is still largely an issue to be sorted out on
a case-to-case basis. An OECD survey found that language referring to environmental concerns is common in multilateral investment treaties but rare in bilateral investment treaties.55 Among
the investment treaties that contain language on environmental
concerns, most of them do so by including general language
recognizing the issue of environmental protection or reserving
policy space for environmental regulations.56 The survey found
only one treaty that explicitly excludes the environmental provisions as a basis for investor-state claims.57
This section discusses case law under the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to illustrate the potential
limitations on environmental regulations due to protection
of investors’ substantive rights. NAFTA Chapter 11 provides
five fundamental principles for investor protection: National
Treatment (Article 1102), Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
(Article 1103), Minimum Standard of Treatment (Article
22

1105), Expropriation and Compensation (Article 1110), and
Performance Requirements (Article 1106). NAFTA Article
1106(6) provides exceptions to the environment-related limits
that Parties can place on, or use to regulate investors58: a party
may adopt “environmental measures” that, inter alia, are “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health”59 or “necessary for the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible
natural resources”60 provided that “such measures are not applied
in an arbitrary or unjustifiable manner, or do not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade or investment.”61
NAFTA Article 1114 (2) addresses the “leakage” issue. It
provides that a party “should not waive or otherwise derogate
from, or offer to waive or otherwise derogate from [domestic
health, safety or environmental] measures as an encouragement
for the establishment, acquisition, expansion or retention in
territory of an investment” (emphasis added).62 Additionally,
to strengthen the environmental framework under NAFTA,
Canada, the United States, and Mexico signed the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, establishing the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to
advise on and strengthen cooperation to solve potential conflicts
between environmental protection and investment protection63
Specifically, under NAAEC Article 10(7), if a party considers
that the other party’s regulatory action violates NAFTA Article
1114(2), the CEC “shall” facilitate agreement between disputing parties within three years by providing recommendations on
assessing the environmental impacts of proposed investment,
consultation between parties, and mitigation of the adverse environmental impacts.64 However, the implementation of NAAEC
Article 10(7) has been criticized, including by a former CEC
official, as being unsuccessful.65
Investors’ expectations of operating in a stable legal and
business environment as protected by trade agreements may well
be an important consideration when countries proceed in promulgating ambitious regulations or other measures to achieve the
emission reduction targets in (I)NDCs. Because the consistency
of these regulations or other measures with the trade regime’s
“most-favored-nation treatment” and “national treatment” provisions are discussed in more detail in the context of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,66 the discussion of case law
under NAFTA focuses on the minimum standard of treatment
(Article 1105), expropriation and compensation (Article 1110),
and performance requirements on investors (Article 1106).

1.1 Article 1105 Minimum Standard of Treatment
NAFTA Article 1105 Minimum Standard of Treatment
protects investor interests in operating in a stable legal and business environment. 67 Importantly, Article 1105 is not a guarantee
against regulatory change, whether or not the change is material.68 Article 1105(1) requires a Party to accord investors of
another Party “treatment in accordance with international law,
including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security.”69 The Tribunal in Mobil Investments Inc. and Murphy
Oil Corporation v. Government of Canada held, after referring
to a line of NAFTA Tribunal cases, that Article 1105(1) prohibits
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

“conduct . . . that is arbitrary, grossly unfair, unjust or idiosyncratic, or is discriminatory and exposes [an investor] to sectional
or racial prejudice, or [lacks] due process leading to an outcome
which offends judicial propriety — as might be the case with
a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or
a complete lack of transparency and candor in any administrative process.”70 To find an Article 1105(1) violation, the Tribunal
held that there should be clear and explicit representations by the
state to induce the investment, reasonable reliance by the investor, and subsequent repudiation by the state.71
Further, a differentiated effect on foreign investors compared with domestic investors, without more, does not lead to a
finding of Article 1105(1) violation. In Methanex Corporation
v. United States of America, the Tribunal rejected an Article
1105(1) claim of a Canadian distributor of methanol that challenges a California ban on the use or sale in California of the
gasoline additive MTBE, which is produced from methanol.72
In its Article 1105(1) claim, Methanex, the Canadian distributor of methanol, relied on the alleged discriminatory motive of
the California government for promulgating the ban. Methanex
argued that the ban was driven by a discriminatory motive to
protect the U.S. ethanol industry.73 Methanex argued that if the
ban was truly driven by California’s concern over chemical leakages from underground storage tanks for gasoline,74 California
would not have banned only one chemical component of gasoline, i.e., MTBE, while allowing other chemicals to leak into the
environment.75 It further argued that instead of banning MTBE,
California could have sought a remedy to the leaking underground storage tanks at a less cost.76
The Tribunal rejected Methanex’s argument for several reasons. First, Methanex failed to present sufficient evidence at the
hearing to establish the discriminatory intent of California government.77 Secondly, the Tribunal found that the discriminatory
intent, even if it was established, is not an element in determining
Article 1105(1) violation.78 The Tribunal reasoned that Article
1105(1) does not mention “discrimination” and therefore does not
preclude differentiated treatment of foreign investors.79 Thirdly,
the Tribunal held that discrimination alone, without more, does
not lead to a finding of Article 1105(1) violation.80 Specifically,
under the holding of Mobil Investments, conduct that violates
Article 1105(1) should be discriminatory and have exposed the
claimant to “sectional or racial prejudice.”81 A similar outcome in
a matter involving renewable energy regulation recently occurred
in Mesa Power Group, LLC v Canada, where a NAFTA Tribunal
supported the Government of Canada’s position that Ontario’s
renewable energy regulation did not constitute a violation of
the US investor’s expectation under Article 1105.82 Moreover, it
added that tribunals should give a “good level of deference to the
manner in which a states regulates its internal affairs.”83
A more recent ruling provided a different outcome for the
party claiming a violation of the fair and equitable treatment
requirement. In Windstream Energy LLC v. Canada, a NAFTA
Tribunal found that, while the Government of Ontario had not
carried out an expropriation, its conduct toward the investment of
a US wind power company consisted of a violation of the “fair
Fall 2016

and equitable treatment” requirement of Article 1105(1).84 In this
case, the Tribunal found as “unfair and inequitable” the manner
in which an application for an offshore wind power facility by a
U.S. based company was handled by the Government of Ontario,
in particular, once the Government decided post-application to
impose a moratorium on offshore wind. The Tribunal faulted the
government for failing to act in a timely and transparent manner
in the handling of the application. It held that “the failure of the
Government of Ontario to take the necessary measures …within a
reasonable period of time after the imposition of the moratorium
to bring clarity to the regulatory uncertainty surrounding the status and the development of the Project created by the moratorium,
constitutes a breach of Article 1105(1) of NAFTA.”85

1.2 Article 1110 Expropriation and Compensation
The manner in which countries implement new regulations
and the timing of doing so are also key aspects to consider in
implementing the commitments of INDCs and NDCs without violating trade agreements. Climate-related regulatory action should
be cognizant that under Article 1110 of NAFTA, nationalization
or expropriation of a foreign investment is permissible only when
doing so is “(a) for a public purpose; (b) on a non-discriminatory
basis; in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1);
and on payment of compensation . . . [that is] equivalent to the fair
market value of the expropriated investment.”86
The Tribunal in Methanex Corporation v. United States
of America elaborated the standard of Article 1110. In finding
that California’s ban of MTBE did not violate Article 1110, the
Tribunal noted that “as a matter of general international law, a
non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is
enacted in accordance with due process . . . is not deemed expropriatory and compensatory unless specific commitments had
been given by the regulating government to the . . . investor contemplating investment that the government would refrain from
such regulation.”87 This case suggests that the factors relevant
to the determination of whether the regulation is non-discriminatory and promulgated with due process include the timeline
of legislation, whether there was scientific study, whether there
was a public hearing, participation of stakeholders, and whether
the complainant investor participated in the legislative process.88
In contrast, the Tribunal in Metalclad Corporation v. The
United Mexican States found an Article 1110 violation based
on a regulatory taking that took place after the government
had made a commitment to allow the investor to proceed with
the contemplated investment.89 In this case, Mexico issued
COTERIN federal and state construction and operating permits
for a proposed landfill.90 Federal officials assured Metalclad
that no municipal permits were needed for undertaking the
landfill project.91 In reliance on such government representation,
Metalclad acquired COTERIN for the sole purpose of developing and operating a landfill site92 and started construction.93
Five months later, the municipality ordered the cessation of
construction due to lack of a municipal construction permit.94
Federal officials then told Metalclad that a municipal permit
was necessary and the municipality would issue the permit as a
23

matter of course.95 Metalclad applied for a municipal construction permit and resumed construction.96 After the landfill was
constructed and had undergone inauguration, the municipality
denied Metalclad’s permit application.97 Metalclad submitted
the NAFTA claim for arbitration.98 Thereafter, the municipality
issued an Ecological Degree declaring a protected area for rare
cactus encompassing the landfill site.99
The Metalclad Tribunal first found the conduct of the
Mexican government violated Article 1105 Minimum Standard
of Treatment by leading Metalclad to believe that it was fully
authorized to construct and operate the landfill under the federal
and state permits;100 by denying Metalclad’s municipal construction permit application without prior notice of the administrative proceeding and an opportunity to appear;101 by denying the
construction permit based only on reasons that were unrelated to
construction or physical aspects of the landfill;102 and by promulgating a regulation that effectively and permanently prevented the
use of Metalclad’s investment.103 The Article 1105 violation, taken
together with the lack of a “timely, orderly, or substantive basis”
for the municipality to deny Metalclad’s permit application, was
found to constitute an indirect expropriation.104 Although there
appears to be a significant overlap between the Tribunal’s reasoning for finding an Article 1110 violation and the reasoning for
finding an Article 1105 violation, the facts in this case illustrate
the relevant aggravating factors for finding expropriation.
As indicated in both the Methanex case and the Metalclad
case, whether the state had the substantive basis for taking the
regulatory action at issue is relevant in finding Article 1105 and
Article 1110 violations. Such substantive basis could lie not
only in existing requirements under domestic law but also in
the state’s obligation under international treaties. The Chemtura
Corporation v. Canada case illustrates the latter situation where
the state’s international obligations negated the finding of unfair
treatment.105 In the Chemtura case, an American investor challenged the Canadian government for terminating registrations of
Chemtura’s products based on findings of a health risk review.106
The Tribunal found the Canadian government agency did
not act in bad faith by launching a risk review process based
on two sets of evidence.107 First, the ban of the same product
in other countries established the existence of the public health
concerns based on which the Canadian government initiated
the risk review and termination of registration.108 Second,
the Canadian government undertook the risk review to fulfill
its obligation under Annex II of the Aarhus Protocol to the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, which requires Canada to assess
the use of such product at issue no later than two years after the
Protocol entered into force.109 Under this reasoning, the Paris
Agreement and a state’s commitment in INDCs and NDCs to
curb GHGs emissions could provide legal grounds for a state’s
regulatory actions aiming at emission reduction, weighing in
favor of finding satisfaction of the required treatment of foreign
investors under NAFTA.
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1.3 Article 1106 Performance Standards on Investors
As discussed previously in Section II.2 of this paper, requiring investments in certain sectors to contribute funds for domestic
climate change mitigation is one of the specific measures proposed
in some INDCs.110 Unless properly instituted, however, such a
measure might arguably constitute a prohibited requirement on
foreign investors to purchase or accord preference to domestic
goods or services under NAFTA Article 1106(1)(c), which prohibits the state from imposing on “investors of a Party or of a nonParty” requirements “to purchase, use or accord a preference to
goods produced or services provided in its territory, or to purchase
goods or services from persons in its territory.”111
In Mobil Investments Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v.
Government of Canada, the Tribunal found the Canadian government’s regulation inconsistent with NAFTA Article 1106(1)
(c).112 The Canadian government requires offshore petroleum
projects to contribute a certain percentage of their revenue to
research and development (“R&D”) and education and training
(“E&T”) as part of a Benefits Plans that project proponents must
prepare as a condition for project approval.113 Specifically, the
R&D and E&T requirement constitutes an obligatory expenditure requirement, although the regulation allows project proponents to decide the specifics of the expenditure modalities in the
Benefits Plans so long as the regulatory expenditure level for
R&D and E&T is met.114
The Tribunal found the R&D and E&T expenditure requirement constitutes “service” under Article 1106.115 Additionally,
the R&D and E&T requirement constitutes a “requirement”
within the meaning of Article 1106 because it is a precondition
for project approval, as opposed to an incidental effect of the
regulation with respect to the purchase, use, or accordance of a
preference to domestic goods or services.116 Finally, the Tribunal
found that to fulfill this requirement in practice, the project proponent would unavoidably have to give preference to domestic
goods or services, even though the regulation does not explicitly
state so.117

2. Cases under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT)
At the outset, it is important to note that the World Trade
Organization (WTO) recognizes the importance of environmental
protection and sustainable development in the field of international
trade.118 These mutually supportive concepts were embedded in
the preamble to the 1994 Agreement Establishing the WTO, which
states that WTO members recognize “that their relations in the
field of trade and economic endeavor should . . . allow for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the objective
of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve
the environment.”119 The Parties to the WTO also established a
Trade and Environment Committee to, inter alia, help facilitate
harmonization between these two regimes.120
Our research did not find any WTO case that challenges a
provision of, or actions taken directly pursuant to a multilateral
environmental agreement (MEA), despite that there are reported
to be hundreds of MEAs and at least twenty of them contain
Sustainable Development Law & Policy

provisions that affect trade.121 These provisions include those
that addressed trade in endangered species, ozone depleting
substances, and hazardous wastes.122 However, these measures,
which are typically product or commodity specific, are unlikely
to impact the global economy to the same degree as regulations
and standards based on GHG emissions, which often deal with
the production process of certain products. Moreover, these
globally agreed MEA measures are specific, typically defining
the regulatory scheme that ratifying countries shall incorporate into national law.123 In contrast, the Paris Agreement is a
procedure-based instrument that lets Parties choose their own
means for achieving their climate friendly ambitions, rather than
tackling directly the issue of compatibility between international
environmental standards and trade treaties. As such, it is important to address some key provisions in WTO agreements that the
Parties taking action under the Paris Agreement may need to
keep in mind.124
The non-discrimination principle of the GATT prohibits discrimination between “like products” based on their countries of
origin. Specifically, under Article I, all “like products” from foreign countries shall be given “most-favored-nation treatment.”125
Under Article III, products from foreign countries shall be given
“no less favorable” treatment than domestic “like products” under
“all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”126

2.1 Article I Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
In general, border measures are likely to violate the “mostfavored-nation treatment” requirement under Article I to the
extent that they are activated based upon the country of origin of
the products.127 In this context, because the international community has not established a uniform trade measure such as a
global carbon tax, as it did, for example, with the possibility of
trade sanctions under the Montreal Protocol, one might envision
a GATT challenge if an importing country were to levy a tax on
imported products measured by the amount of GHG emissions
or energy consumed in the production process.128 Article I may
well countenance a scheme whereby an importing country establishes a tax scheme on imported goods that reflects the carbon
taxes that their own “like products” are subject to in the countries of origin of the imported goods, if any.129 Alternatively,
the importing country could apply the same tax on all “like
products” regardless of the exporting country and request the
exporting countries to rebate to their exporters the GHG-related
tax paid to the importing country.130 In case the exporting country refuses to do so, the exporters would face a different tax on
products from that country and therefore violation of Article I
appears inevitable.
A similar issue might arise where an importing country
would impose a higher tax or tariff on automobiles that release
or consumed higher amounts of GHGs in their manufacture.
The scheme would have to be tested on whether the products
are “like products” given their different GHG emissions in the
production process. Early GATT cases indicate that likeness
is found based on product characteristics, end uses, consumer
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preferences, and tariff classification.131 The process and production methods (PPMs) of the product, such as the GHG emissions
during production of the automobile, do not necessarily affect
these factors that influence the finding of “likeness.” It is noted
that, however, the amount of GHG emissions during production
process might affect the “consumer preference” factor in the
likeness determination.
For the environmental community, such WTO case rulings
raise the concern that trade measures could not be based solely
upon the GHG emissions in the production process without
violating Article I, unless the GHG emissions correlates with
the physical characteristics of the final product. However, even
if there is an Article I violation due to differentiated treatment
among “like” automobiles, such treatment might be justified
under Article XX exceptions (b) and (g), which are discussed
further in later sections.132

2.2. Article III National Treatment
Article III applies to internal measures, such as a GHGrelated tax or an energy-efficiency standard on certain products.
Article III:2 requires that imported products shall not be subject
to internal taxes in excess of those applied to like domestic products.133 The Appellate Body held in Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages that to find a violation of Article III, there should
not only be a finding that directly competitive or substitutable
products are not similarly taxed, but also the dissimilar taxation
“must be more than de minimis.”134
Article III:4 requires imported products be provided no
less favorable treatment as “like” domestic products.135 The
Canada–Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Program case
provides an example where a facially neutral feed-in tariff (FIT)
program was found to have violated Article III:4 for tying the
program’s benefits with the requirement of using domestic content in energy production, even though participation in the FIT
program is made based on contracts between the government and
private entities.136 The FIT Program was implemented in 2009 to
increase the mix of electricity from certain renewable sources in
the Ontario electricity system.137 Generators participating in the
FIT Program are paid a guaranteed price under twenty-year or
forty-year contracts with the government.138 In addition, when
building solar or wind power electricity generation facilities
with production capacity of more than 10kW, the generator
must ensure that the facilities satisfy the “Minimum Required
Domestic Content Level”; a requirement on the purchase or use
of products of Canadian origin or from a Canadian source.139 In
other words, compliance with the “Minimum Required Domestic
Content Level” is a prerequisite for generators using solar PV
and wind power to participate in the FIT Program and thereby
benefit under the FIT Program.140
“No less favorable” treatment, however, does not require
identical treatment.141 The Appellate Body held in European
Communities–Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products that the mere existence of distinctions in
treating like products does not necessarily lead to a finding of less
favorable treatment.142 Such differentiated treatment is potentially
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permissible under Article III:4 if the differentiation is based on
factors other than country of origin, such as market share of the
importer.143 Importantly, the “less favorable treatment” determination is made based on an individual case of the imported products.
In this determination, the argument that the regulatory program at
issue is generally non-discriminatory by “balancing more favorable treatment of some imported products against less favorable
treatment of other products” is irrelevant.144
A frequently contested issue in finding Article III violation
is the “likeness” of products. Relevant factors in the determination of likeness include: the products’ end-uses in a given
market, consumers’ tastes and habits, the product’s properties,
nature and quality, tariff classification,145 and the existence of
competitive relationship between the products in the marketplace.146 This is not an exhaustive list because the Appellate
Body expressly refrained from defining the “precise scope of
the word ‘like.’”147 Restrictions on products based on their
production process might be upheld under Article III to the
extent that such restrictions go to the physical characteristics
and market competitiveness of the product.148

2.3 Article XX Exceptions for
Environmental Protection
2.3.1 Article XX chapeau: prohibition of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination and disguised
trade restriction
As is demonstrated by our discussion below, an important
GATT provision that can underpin trade and environmental
harmonization is that regulations that would otherwise violate
the non-discrimination principles set out in GATT, including
Articles I and III, could be justified under GATT’s Article XX
exceptions. The chapeau of Article XX stipulates that the regulatory actions justified under the exceptions under Article XX
shall not be “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail” or “a disguised
restriction on international trade.”149 In determining whether a
regulatory action meets these requirements, the Appellate Body
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) considers (i) whether
less discriminatory courses of action are available;150 (ii) whether
the regulating country made good faith effort to negotiate on a
continuous basis with all affected trading partners before imposing trade restrictions, even if no agreement was reached;151 (iii)
whether the same factors are examined in designing restrictions
on foreign products and in designing restrictions on domestic
products;152 (iv) and whether the regulation takes into account
different conditions in trading partner countries and when necessary, maintains some flexibility given such differences.153 The
party invoking the exceptions under Article XX bears the burden
of demonstrating that the challenged regulatory action, in its
application, is consistent with the chapeau.154
In United States–Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, Brazil and Venezuela successfully
challenged a U.S. regulation for being inconsistent with Article
III:4 on national treatment155 and unjustifiable under Article XX
exceptions.156 The challenged regulation, promulgated as part of
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the gasoline program under the Clean Air Act, required conventional gasoline sold by domestic refiners, blenders, and importers
in the United States to be as clean as 1990 baseline levels.157 The
1990 baselines can be individually established based on actual
1990 data of the regulated entity or statutorily established by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) based on the average gasoline quality in the United States in 1990.158 Refiners of
domestically produced gasoline are required to establish individual baselines calculated based on the methodology provided by
the EPA unless actual 1990 data are unavailable.159 About 97%
of U.S. refiners established individual baselines.160 Importers
of gasoline are instead required to apply the statutory baseline,
except in the rare case that they could establish an individual
baseline.161 The U.S. challenged the WTO Panel’s finding that
these baseline establishment provisions are not justified under
Article XX.162
The Appellate Body found these baseline provisions failed
to meet the prerequisites of the chapeau of Article XX.163 It
found that the existence of more than one less discriminatory
alternative to the baseline determination provisions, such as
imposing the statutory baseline to both domestic and imported
gasoline.164 The U.S. EPA argued that differentiated treatment
between domestic and foreign refiners was warranted because
verifying and enforcing individual baselines on foreign refiners would be administratively difficult.165 The Appellate Body,
however, agreed with the Panel’s finding that the U.S. failed
to provide sufficient justification for denying foreign refiners
individual baselines given the “reasonably available” means
to verify and assess data relating to imported goods.166 The
Appellate Body suggested that the United States should have
initiated negotiation with Venezuela and Brazil to resolve the
administrative problems in applying individual baselines on foreign refiners, although reaching an agreement is not required.167
In addition, the Appellate Body noted that the United States
considered compliance costs for domestic refiners, yet did not
consider the same for foreign refiners.168 Based on these omissions, the Appellate Body found the discriminatory effect of the
baseline establishment provisions was not “merely inadvertent
or unavoidable.”169
The rigidity and inflexibility in the application of the regulation at issue across different affected countries also contributes to
the finding of “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination.”170 This
finding was also the case in United States–Import Prohibition
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products.171 A group of Asian
developing countries, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand, successfully challenged a U.S. regulation to protect sea turtles as
constituting arbitrary discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail.172 The regulation at issue required
all U.S. shrimp trawl vessels to use Turtle Excluder Devices
(TEDs) or tow-time restrictions in certain specified areas.173 It
also imposed a world-wide import ban, starting on May 1, 1996,
on imported shrimp harvested with commercial fishing technology which adversely affects sea turtles unless (i) the harvesting
nation is certified by the United States to have a program regulating the incidental taking of sea turtles in shrimp harvesting
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that is comparable to that of the United States, and the average
rate of incidental taking by the vessels of the shrimp exporting
country is comparable to that by U.S. vessels; or (ii) the fishing environment of the shrimp exporting country does not pose
a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles in the course of
shrimp harvesting.174
The Appellate Body found the regulation to be rigid and
inflexible and that it constituted “unjustifiable and arbitrary
discrimination” for three main reasons.175 First, in practice, in
determining the comparability of regulatory programs, U.S. government officials relied only on whether the exporting country’s
regulatory program requires the use of TEDs.176 Considering
both the language of the regulation and the practice in applying the regulation, the Appellate Body found the regulation was
coercive in that it required other shrimp exporting countries to
adopt regulations that are “essentially the same” as that applicable to U.S. vessels, without considering whether such regulations would be appropriate for those countries.177 Second, only
exporting countries, not individual vessels, could be certified.
As such, shrimp caught using methods identical to those used
in the United States had been banned from U.S. market only
because they were caught in waters of countries that had not
been certified by the United States.178 Third, the effective date
of the import ban did not take into account the fact that different
exporting countries would require different phase-in periods to
develop or obtain transfer of the required TED technology.179
The Panel and Appellate decisions in United States–Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products and the
subsequent United States — Shrimp: Implementation Phase further clarify the requirement of seeking cooperative agreements
through negotiations before imposing trade restrictions. The
United States did negotiate the Inter-American Convention for
the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles and concluded
the Convention in September 1996.180 However, the United
States only proposed to negotiate similar agreements with other
affected exporting nations after concluding the Inter-American
Convention, and therefore after the effective date of the import
ban (i.e., May 1, 1996).181 The Appellate Body found the United
State’s failure to negotiate with all affected trading partners such
as the group of Asian countries in this case was unjustifiable
discrimination.182
To address the Appellate Body’s finding on the issue of
failure to seek cooperative agreements with trading partners,
the United States subsequently engaged in negotiations at a
“sustained pace” with countries in the Indian Ocean region.183 It
also sought to meet the policy objective of protecting sea turtles
through the mechanisms under other international treaties, such
as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
of Wild Fauna and Flora.184 Both the Panel and the Appellate
Body in United States — Shrimp: Implementation Phase found
the United States had fulfilled its obligation to negotiate and that
concluding an agreement is not a condition of avoiding a finding
of “unjustifiable discrimination.”185
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2.3.2 Article XX(b) and (g) exceptions
Exceptions under Article XX(b) and (g) are likely to be
of particular relevance to the design of climate related policy
instruments. Under Article XX(b) regulatory actions that would
otherwise violate the GATT non-discrimination principle can
be justified if they are “necessary to protect human, animal or
planet life or health” (emphasis added),186 provided that such
actions are not arbitrary or an unjustifiable discrimination or disguised restriction on trade, as stipulated in the chapeau of Article
XX. Finding the regulatory action as “necessary” requires a
showing that there are no “reasonably available” measures that
are “consistent or less inconsistent with” the GATT.187
Article XX(g) provides that the regulations that would
otherwise violate the GATT non-discrimination principle
would be justified if they are “relating to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption” (emphasis added) and meeting the requirements
stipulated in the chapeau of Article XX.188 To be considered as
“relating to” conservation, the regulation must be “primarily
aimed at” the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource.
However, the regulation does not need to be essential for the
conservation is not required.189 The term “exhaustible natural
resources” has been held to include both non-living and living natural resources.190 In defining the scope of “exhaustible
natural resources,” the Appellate Body may but does not have to
draw on other treaties.191 The Appellate Body in the EC–Biotech
case clarifies that these treaties are relevant in interpreting the
trade agreement not necessarily because they are legal rules,192
but because they provide “evidence of the ordinary meaning of
terms” of GATT (or other WTO agreements).193
Critical to the analysis of measures that may aid in implementing Paris Agreement obligations is that clean air has been
recognized as an “exhaustible natural resource” within the
meaning of Article XX(g).194 In holding so in United States–
Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, the
Panel relied on the ordinary meaning of the term “exhaustible
natural resources” without referring to other environmental
treaties.195 Further, the Panel found clean air is exhaustible even
though it is renewable.196 The fact that at least at this moment,
the international community and all of its major GHG emitting
countries, have recognized in the Paris Agreement the “need
for an effective and progressive response to the urgent threat of
climate change,”197 can only serve to fortify the Panel’s reasoning that measures to protect the atmosphere merit the protection
afforded under Article XX.

3. Cases under the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (hereinafter “TBT Agreement”) authorizes “technical regulations” that
restrict trade so long as they do not create “unnecessary obstacles to international trade” and are not “more trade-restrictive
than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective” such as “protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health,
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or the environment.”198 The standard of determining whether a
measure is “necessary” is similar to that in finding GATT Article
XX exceptions,199 which considers the existence of less restrictive measures, and the effectiveness of the measure at issue in
relation to the policy objective pursued.200
Annex 1 of the TBT Agreement defines a “technical regulation” as a document that specifies “product characteristics
or their related processes and production methods, including
the applicable administrative provisions, in which compliance
is mandatory,” or requirements on “terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labeling . . . as they apply to a product,
process or production method.”201 The issue that is likely to be
contested is whether a specification on a product’s production
process constitutes a valid “technical regulation” under the TBT
Agreement. A challenge under the TBT is most likely to arise if
there is question whether a process-based specification is made
strictly in relation to a product’s characteristics. If the processbased specification is indeed applicable to product’s physical
characteristics, it can be considered as within the “applicable
administrative provisions” under Annex 1 and therefore within
the ambit of TBT Agreement.202
In European Communities–Measures Prohibiting the
Importation and Marketing of Seal Products, the European
Union imposed a Seal Regime, which provides that “any person
wishing to import and/or place seal products . . . must have such
products certified by a recognized body . . . [and] the products
must be accompanied by an attesting document . . . indicat[ing]
whether the products result from hunts conducted by Inuit or
other indigenous communities, or from hunts for the sustainable management of marine resources.”203 The WTO Appellate
Body held that these requirements do not prescribe or impose
any characteristics on the products themselves, but only establish the criteria on the identity of the hunter and the type of the
hunt.204 Therefore, these provisions of the Seal Regime are not
a “technical regulation” within the meaning of Annex 1.1 to the
TBT Agreement.
As discussed earlier, a labeling system for appliances is
one of the specifically proposed mitigation measures in INDCs.
Labeling requirements indicating energy efficiency, which is one
type of physical characteristic of a product, have been adopted
in many countries.205 However, our research has not identified
any country that has imposed a mandatory labeling requirement to indicate GHG emissions during the production process
of the product.206 One could envision exporters challenging
such a requirement as a TBT violation by alleging that such a
requirement is not an inherent element of the final product, and
thereby not a physical characteristic of the product. However,
given that the international community has agreed that GHGs
must be reduced, it seems easier to contend that products that are
responsible for emitting more GHGs than other products are, in
fact, not “like products”. For example, one could contend that
if GHG output during production were irrelevant, there would
be no need for a global agreement to reduce GHGs. Of course,
imposition of such a requirement would still need to satisfy the
transparency and fairness principles set forth above.
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IV. Conclusion
The Paris Agreement is the first global agreement in which
both developed and developing countries are obligated to undertake actions to mitigate and adapt to climate change impacts.
Harmonious with this aspiration, trade agreements and their
case law explicitly recognize the right of states to impose environmental restrictions on trade to conserve clean air and protect
public health. Nevertheless, the substantive requirements in
trade agreements may, in some instances, limit the forms and
means of implementation of climate-related regulations. 207
Based on the review of the case law under NAFTA, GATT,
and the TBT Agreement, there are a few general principles that
countries should follow in pursuing regulatory actions to reduce
GHG emissions.
When countries move forward with a potentially diverse
array of regulatory and policy instruments to implement the Paris
Agreement, they will need to remain cognizant of the longstanding trade regime principles that seek to ensure transparency and
fairness. The purpose of these due process and fairness requirements is to ensure that investors and trading partners operate in a
stable legal and business environment. Generally, the regulatory
process should be protective of investors’ expectations in reliance on previous commitments or representation made by the
government; afford investors opportunities to participate and be
heard in the administrative or regulation making process; and
be within the legal mandate afforded by domestic law and/or
applicable international treaties.
Trade agreements generally do not allow differentiated
treatment of like products based solely on the products’ countries of origin, with exceptions.208 Regulating governments need
to pay particular attention to two aspects of this general principle
when contemplating climate-related regulations that could, for
instance, incentivize the reduction of GHG emissions in manufacturing and industrial processes. First, the “likeness” determination among products should be generally based on their
physical characteristics and usage. Further, consumer preference
toward the products at issue could be a relevant factor in determining “likeness,” at least under the GATT case law. As such, if
the public attaches more value to the environmental cost when
purchasing products, there is likely to be a stronger argument
that GHG emission in the products’ lifecycle is a differentiating
factor among these products. In this light, it is important to recognize the potential evolution of the concept of “like products”
given countries’ commitment to achieve the global GHG emission reduction target in the Paris Agreement.
Second, differentiated treatment among like products does
not necessarily implicate discrimination and/or trade protectionism. The potential violation of the non-discrimination principle
of major trade agreements is likely to arise when the primary
basis for differentiated treatment is the products’ countries
of origin.209 For example, an importing country may wish to
design different treatment of certain imported products based
on the GHG emissions in the exporter’s production process. The
importing country might find defending such differentiation
challenging if it cannot account for the GHG emissions from
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the production process of the imported products due to a lack of
data and administrative difficulties in accounting and monitoring. A solution to deal with this deficit could be to invest in an
equivalent assessment of the relevant GHG related regulations
on a country-to-country basis, and to reflect such countrybased assessment in the level of differentiated treatment among
imported like products. However, unless done in convincing and
rigorous fashion, pursuing this approach could run afoul of the
non-discrimination principle in trade agreements.
It is important to note that both the NAFTA and GATT provide important exceptions, under which countries could potentially justify such GHG trade measures to protect public health
and the clean air as an exhaustible natural resource. However, in
doing so, the enacting country may be required to:
• engage in meaningful negotiation with affected foreign
countries in an effort to harmonize their environmental
policies and resolve the administrative difficulties in designing and enforcing the contemplated regulation on foreign
entities;
• pursue/consider and rule out less restrictive alternatives;
• ensure that the same considerations are given to all regulated entities, domestic and foreign ones, in designing the
regulation; and
• consider building in the regulation some level of flexibility
when the regulatory conditions and capacity of trading partners with regard to the issue at hand are highly different.210
Moreover, these requirements on the enacting country could
require a lengthy and costly rule-making process. This process

might delay the adoption of some of the policy instruments
declared in the INDCs and NDCs. Additionally, countries may
not necessarily be able to avoid going through such extensive
negotiation and rule-making process by embedding the GHGrelated requirement in a government program, implemented
through contracts between the government and participating
foreign investors.211 The mere fact that such a requirement is
imposed on participating investors as a condition of domestic
investment as opposed to the traditional command-and-control
schemes does not necessarily eliminate the restrictive nature of
such government requirement, especially when the requirement
is a nonnegotiable precondition for investment approval.212 A
recent GATT case seems to have expanded the reach of trade
agreements to this type of regulatory programs implemented on
a contractual basis. 213
In sum, the Paris Agreement itself does not directly modify
the interface between trade agreements and international
environmental agreements. However, we anticipate new developments in the case law to further delineate such interface as
Parties to the Paris Agreement enact requirements to pursue
national commitments and address the urgent global threat of
climate change proclaimed by almost 200 countries. While cases
adjudicated under major trade agreements have provided a foundation for justifying trade restrictions driven by these climaterelated considerations, countries should still remain cognizant of
the need for fairness, transparency, and proactive engagement
when pursuing GHG emission reduction targets that potentially
affect trade.
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